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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 940231-CA 
v. : Priority No. 2 
BRUCE LABEAU, : 
Defendant/Appellant, : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction for possession of a 
dangerous weapon at a correctional facility, a second degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-311.3(4) (c) (Supp. 
1994), in the Fifth Judicial District Court in and for Iron 
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Robert T. Braithwaite, 
presiding. This Court has jurisdiction to hear the case pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (f) (1994). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Was defendant prejudiced by the trial court's 
denial of his motion to excuse two potential jurors for cause 
where the State used the first two of its four peremptory 
challenges to remove those same potential jurors from the jury? 
A defendant claiming that a trial court failed to 
remove a juror for cause must demonstrate that he was prejudiced 
by that failure by showing that a member of the jury was partial 
or incompetent. State v. Menzies, 239 Utah Adv. Rep. 23, 24 
(Utah 1994) . 
2. Did the trial court properly reject defendant's 
claim that Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-311.3(4) (c) (Supp. 1994) is 
unconstitutionally vague because it does not define the term 
"dangerous weapon" where the term "dangerous weapon" is defined 
under Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601 (1992), which expressly states 
that its definition of "dangerous weapon" apples to other 
provisions title 76? 
A trial court's decision on the constitutionality of a 
statute presents a pure question of law that is reviewed for 
correctness without according any deference to the trial court. 
State v. Pharris. 846 P.2d 454, 465 (Utah App. 1993). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-311.3 (Supp. 1994), Items 
prohibited in correctional facilities -- Penalties: 
(4)(c) Any offender who possesses at a 
correctional facility any firearm, 
ammunition, dangerous weapon, explosive, 
or implement of escape is guilty of a 
second degree felony. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601. Definitions: 
(5) "Dangerous weapon" means any item 
capable of causing death or serious 
bodily injury, or a facsimile or 
representation of the item, and: 
(a) the actor's use or apparent intended 
use of the item leads the victim to 
reasonably believe the item is likely to 
cause death or serious bodily injury; or 
(b) the actor represents to the victim 
verbally of in any other manner that he is in 
control of such an item. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by information with possession of 
a dangerous weapon by an offender at a correctional facility, a 
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-
311-3(4) (c) (Supp. 1994) (R. 1-2, 72-3). Following defendant's 
jury trial, the jury found defendant guilty as charged in the 
information (R.145-46, 316-17). The trial court entered judgment 
against defendant and sentenced him to a term of one to 15 years 
in the Utah State Prison (R. 149-51). Defendant appeals from 
that judgment. 
Defense counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. 
California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 11>96 (1967) 
STATEMENT OF TEE FACTS1 
Defen.^it was an inmate h-^sed at the Iron County/Utah 
State Correctional Facility in Cedar City, Utah (R. 233-34). On 
June 10, 1993, correctional officers suspected that defendant was 
intoxicated because he was having difficulty standing and 
walking, and because his speech was slurred (R. 238, 241, 248). 
Defendant was told to return to his cell and that officials 
intended to have him perform a breath intoxilyzer test to check 
if he was intoxicated (R. 249-52). 
Correction Officers Richard Dickinson, James Mitchell, 
and Glen Allred went to defendant's cell to escort him to another 
1
 Unless otherwise noted, this brief recites the facts from 
the record in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict. 
State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 117 (Utah 1989); see also State v. 
Moore, 782 P.2d 497, 501 (Utah 1989). 
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area of the prison for testing (R. 252-53) . The officers 
attempted to persuade defendant to go with them voluntarily, but 
defendant refused to be moved and told the officers, "[d]o what 
you got to do" (R. 263-64). When the officers entered 
defendant's cell to handcuff him for transportation, they learned 
that the floor of his cell had been "soaped up," a procedure that 
inmates use to make it difficult for officers to enter the cell 
because it makes the officers "slip and slide" (R. 261-2, 266). 
The officers were nonetheless able to handcuff defendant, conduct 
a cursory patdown search of him, and escort defendant to the 
admissions area for the intoxilyzer test (R. 253). 
Efforts to get defendant to perform the intoxilyzer 
test were unsuccessful (R. 242) . After several attempts, the 
officers decided to put defendant in a holding cell. Before 
removing defendant from admissions, the officers again searched 
defendant for weapons (R. 267). During that search, Mitchell 
found a "shank" in defendant front right pocket (R. 268-70, 278) . 
A "shank" is "a homemade knife" constructed by a prison inmate 
that is used "to inflict injury" on other inmates or guards (R. 
259-60) . Specifically, shanks are objects such as gym equipment 
of flatware that inmates sharpen and sometimes wrap with tape or 
cloth to make a handle (R. 243-44) . 
Based on the recovery of the shank found in defendant's 
possession while he was an inmate at the Iron County/Utah State 
Correctional Facility, defendant was charged with possession of a 
4 
dangerous weapon at a correctional facility, and the matter was 
set for a jury trial. 
Following voir dire of the prospective jurors, a bench 
conference was held at which defendant challenged two prospective 
jurors for cause. The substance of that conference was restated 
for the record as follows: 
THE COURT: 
MR. HOLM: 
THE COURT: 
MR. BURNS: 
Okay. The jury has now exited. For 
that matter, we had a -- counsel had a 
conversation at the bench regarding Mr. 
Holm's two challenges for cause. We 
probably ought to restate it in case it 
wasn't picked up. 
Yes, Your Honor. I challenged Mrs. 
Koyle and Mrs. Decker for cause. Mrs. 
Koyle because she's employed by youth 
corrections. I believe that's a close 
enough connection with the department of 
corrections that she ought to be 
dismissed. And Mrs. Decker because her 
daughter is in the attorney general's 
office, which, of course, is a 
prosecutorial agency and is the State of 
Utah, basically. 
All right. I denied the request and 
allowed them to be seated for the reason 
that they had -- they had indicated that 
they did not feel a bias and would be 
comfortable handling the case or being 
in Mr. LaBeau's position even if a juror 
--if there was a juror with their 
attitude on the jury. 
And so having made a record of that, 
what was your --
My record is just briefly, Your Honor, 
out of an overabundance of caution, I 
would like the record to reflect that 
the State used its initial peremptory 
challenges to remove juror number one, 
Ms. Koyle, and juror number 14, Ms. 
Decker. Those are the very jurors that 
defendant objected to. 
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While I agreed with the Court that it 
was distant, and both jurors said that 
they could hear the evidence fairly, for 
purposes of any claim whatsoever on 
appeal, the record should state that the 
State agreed and used its peremptory 
challenges to remove those two jurors. 
THE COURT: Okay. A handwritten note should reflect 
that as well. 
Any other matters? 
MR. HOLM: Nothing further, Your Honor. 
(R. 223-224) . (Copies of these pages of the record are attached 
hereto as addendum A.) The "voir dire jury list" indicates that 
the State removed Ms. Koyle and Ms. Decker with peremptory 
challenges (R. 123). 
After the State rested, defendant moved for dismissal 
on the ground that Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-311.3(4) (c) (Supp. 1994) 
was unconstitutionally vague because it did not define the term 
"dangerous weapon" (R. 288-93). (Copies of these pages of the 
record are attached hereto as addendum B.) The trial court 
denied defendant's motion because the term "dangerous weapon" is 
defined under Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601(5) (1992), and the 
question of whether the "shank" defendant had in his possession 
was within the scope of that definition was a jury question (R. 
293). The jury's verdict of guilty evidences its determination 
that the shank taken from defendant was a dangerous weapon. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Defendant's claim that the trial court failed to remove 
two jurors for cause is wholly frivolous because the State used 
its first two peremptory challenges to strike the jurors in 
6 
question. Accordingly, defendant can demonstrate no prejudice 
flowing from the court's ruling. 
Defendant's other claim, that he was denied due process 
because the term "dangerous weapon" is not defined under Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-8-311.3 (4) (c) (Supp. 1994), is wholly frivolous 
because that termed is defined under Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601(5) 
(1992), which is applicable to all provisions of title 76. In 
any event, ordinary people would easily recognize that 
defendant's homemade knife was a dangerous weapon. This Court 
should affirm defendant's conviction. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT WAS NOT PREJUDICED BY THE TRIAL 
COURT'S REFUSAL TO STRIKE TWO POTENTIAL 
JURORS THAT DEFENDANT CHALLENGED FOR CAUSE 
Defendant was not prejudiced by the trial court's 
refusal to dismiss two members of the jury pool for cause. 
Accordingly, defendant's claim that the trial court improperly 
denied his for cause challenges to potential jurors Koyle and 
Decker should be rejected on the grounds that any alleged error 
was harmless. See e.q. State v. Johnson. 784 P.2d 1135, 1140 
(Utah 1989) (alleged error does not require reversal unless 
defendant demonstrates that there is a reasonable likelihood that 
a more favorable outcome would have been obtained had the alleged 
error not occurred). 
Under State v. Menzies, 239 Utah Adv. Rep. 23, (Utah 
1994), "tt]o prevail on a claim of error based on the failure to 
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remove a juror for cause, a defendant must demonstrate prejudice, 
viz., show that a member of the jury was partial or incompetent." 
In this case, not only does defendant not allege that a member of 
the jury was partial or incompetent, but defendant was not even 
forced to use any of his peremptory challenges to have either 
Koyle or Decker removed. Rather, the State used its first two 
peremptory challenges to strike the challenged jurors from the 
panel (R. 123, 223-34). Accordingly, defendant can claim no 
prejudice flowing from the trial court's alleged error in failing 
to remove Koyle and Decker for cause. Defendant's assertion to 
the contrary should be rejected as wholly frivolous. 
POINT II 
THE STATUTE PROHIBITING INMATES PROM 
POSSESSING DANGEROUS WEAPONS IS NOT 
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE 
The trial court properly rejected defendant's claim 
that Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-311.3 (4) (c) (Supp. 1994) was 
unconstitutionally vague because it did not define the term 
"dangerous weapon." It is well established that Utah courts 
"presume the constitutionality" of statutes. See, e.g. Pharris, 
846 P.2d at 465. In order to overcome the presumption of 
constitutionality accorded statutes, defendant argues section 76-
8-311.3(4) (c) is invalid under the due process void-for-vagueness 
doctrine. That doctrine requires a statute to define an "offense 
with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand 
what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not 
encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." Kolander v. 
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Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357, 103 S. Ct. 1855, 1858 (1983) (quoted 
in Pharris, 846 P.2d at 466) . Here, defendant argues that 
section 76-8-311.3(4) (c) is unconstitutionally vague because it 
does not define the term "dangerous weapon." The trial court 
properly rejected that claim. 
The term "dangerous weapon55 is clearly defined under 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601(5) (1992). That provision expressly 
states that the definition of dangerous weapon articulated 
therein applies to all other provisions of title 76. The trial 
court recognized that fact in the proceedings below (R. 291-92), 
and instructed the jury on the definition of dangerous weapon 
accordingly (R. 132). Moreover, section 76-1-601(5) aside, 
"ordinary people" would readily recognize that a homemade knife 
such as that confiscated from defendant is a "dangerous weapon" 
because it plainly can be used to inflict serious bodily injury 
or to cause death. The trial court's rejection of defendant's 
void-for-vagueness challenge to section 76-8-311.3 (4) (c) should 
therefore be upheld because defendant's complaint is wholly 
frivolous. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing arguments, this Court should 
deem the issues raised by defendant wholly frivolous, affirm 
defendant's conviction and allow defense counsel to withdraw from 
representation. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this T ^ day of November, 
1994. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
TODD A. UTZIN0ER 
Assistant Attorney General 
Criminal Appeals Division 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that two true and accurate copies of 
the foregoing Brief of Appellee were mailed, via first class 
mail, to Floyd W. Holm, attorney for appellant, 965 South Main, 
Suite 3, P.O. Box 765, Cedar City, Utah 84720, this Y — day of 
November, 1994. 
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Addenda 
Addendum A 
Transcript of Defendant's Motion to 
Strike Jurors Koyle and Decker 
and Trial Court's Ruling 
65 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. BURNS: Thank you. 
THE COURT: You can go ahead and go to the 
lobby. 
(Whereupon, a discussion was had among Court 
and counsel in open court out of the hearing of 
the jury, which was recorded as follows:) 
THE COURT: Okay. The jury has now exited. For 
that matter, we had a — counsel had a conversation at the 
bench regarding Mr. Holm's two challenges for cause. We 
probably ought to restate it in case it wasn't picked up. 
MR. HOLM: Yes, Your Honor. I challenged 
Mrs. Koyle and Mrs. Decker for cause. Mrs. Koyle because 
she's employed by youth corrections. I believe that's a 
close enough connection with the department of corrections 
that she ought to be dismissed. And Mrs. Decker because 
her daughter is in the attorney general's office, which, of 
course, is a prosecutorial agency and is the State of Utah, 
basically. 
THE COURT: All right. I denied the request and 
allowed them to be seated for the reason that they had — 
they had indicated that they did not feel a bias and would 
be comfortable handling the case or being in Mr. LaBeau's 
position even if a juror on — if there were a juror with 
their attitude on the jury. 
PAUL G. MCMULLIN 
n n r\ 
1 And so having made a record of that, what was 
2 your — 
3 MR. BURNS: My record is just briefly, Your 
4 Honor, out of an overabundance of caution, I would like the 
5 record to reflect that the State used its initial 
6 peremptory challenges to remove juror number one, 
7 Ms. Koyle, and juror number 14, Ms. Decker. Those are the 
8 very jurors that the defendant objected to. 
9 While I agreed with the Court that it was 
10 distant, and both jurors said that they could hear the 
11 evidence fairly, for purposes of any claim whatsoever on 
12 appeal, the record should state that the State agreed and 
13 used its peremptory challenges to remove those two jurors. 
14 THE COURT: Okay. A handwritten note should 
15 reflect that as well. 
16 Any other matters? 
17 MR. HOLM: Nothing further, Your Honor. 
18 THE COURT: Okay. Let's take a 15-minute 
19 recess. I've got the jury out of the courtroom and in the 
20 lobby area. So if Mr. LaBeau needs a drink or to use the 
21 rest room, he's welcome to use the jury facilities. 
22 I MR. BURNS: Thank you. 
23 (Whereupon, a recess was taken.) 
24 THE COURT: Okay. Let's do this. Let's get the 
25 attorneys, and then I think the jurors — I was just 
PAULG.MCMULLIN 
OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER n~-iy) 
Addendum B 
Transcript of Trial Court's Ruling on 
Defendant's Void-for-Vagueness Challenge 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-311.3 (c) (4) (Supp. 1994) 
1 MR. HOLM: Your Honor, may we take a short 
2 recess and take up a matter out of the presence of the 
3 jury? 
4 THE COURT: Okay. I'll ask the jury — 
5 If you'll escort them to the jury room. 
6 We have got a rest room and I hope water and 
7 cups in there. But if you will go to the jury room, we'll 
8 take up a legal matter and then have you brought out in a 
9 few minutes. 
10 Do we have enough chairs in there? Sometimes ~ 
11 okay. 
12 (Whereupon, a discussion was had among Court 
13 and counsel in open court out of the hearing of 
14 the jury, which was recorded as follows:) 
15 THE COURT: All right. The jury has left the 
16 courtroom. 
17 MR. HOLM: Thank you, Your Honor. 
18 At this time, we'd like to make a motion to 
19 dismiss for failure to show a prima facie case. The basis 
20 for my motion, Your Honor, is basically this. There is no 
21 definition under the offense that Mr. LaBeau has been 
22 charged with of a dangerous weapon. At least not that I 
23 can find. And as I understand criminal law — criminal 
24 procedure, the defendant has to be given some indication of 
25 the crime of which he is charged. And there has to be some 
PAUL G. MCMULLIN 
OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER 1~?1 
1 reasonable clarity, I guess, in the statutes as to what is 
2 criminal and what is not, otherwise, under the United 
3 States Constitution, it's void for vagueness. And if — if 
4 you want to look at Section 76-8-311.3, there is no 
5 definition whatsoever as to what a dangerous weapon is, and 
6 so I don't see how there's -- how — how we have clarity in 
7 the sense of Mr. LaBeau knows that his possession of this 
8 shank was — was, in fact, a crime. 
9 The statute does define "offender," it defines 
10 "correctional facility," it defines "medicine," it defines 
11 "official custody," but for one reason or another, it does 
12 not define the dangerous weapon. And we think for that 
13 reason, it's void for vagueness, and that the case ought to 
14 be dismissed. 
15 THE COURT: Mr. Burns? 
16 MR. BURNS: Well, it's a unique argument. It 
17 doesn't define knowing and intentionally, which the State 
18 also has to prove. It does not define Iron County; it 
19 doesn't define state of Utah; it doesn't talk about the 
20 respective requirements of jurisdiction and venue. I think 
21 the Court is well aware that if the definition is found at 
22 I or near the applicable statute, that can be used. 
23 The Court can also look to other provisions in 
24 the criminal code where the legislature has saw fit to 
25 define words. And if it wants, the Court can go to the 
PAULG.MCMULLIN 
OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER T-HO 
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dictionary and define words for purposes of — of clarity 
with respect to their common use and meaning. 
"Dangerous weapon" is found defined in the 
criminal code. It's defined as — that you are instructed 
that a dangerous weapon means any item capable of 
causing ~ 
THE COURT: Cite me to — I've got 311 in front 
of me# but Where's — Where's the definition of dangerous 
weapon? 
MR. BURNS: It's under the definitions in Title 
7. And I didn't anticipate Mr. Holm's motion, so I don't 
have the specific code section at the tip of my tongue. 
THE COURT: Where are you reading from? 
MR. BURNS: I'm reading froir the instruction. 
THE COURT: That you submitted earlier? 
MR. BURNS: To the Court. 
THE COURT: All right. Let me see if I can find 
the — a definition. 
76-1-601, subsection five. "'Dangerous weapon' 
means any item capable of causing death or serious bodily 
injury or facsimile or representation of the item, and: 
"(a), the actor's use or apparent intended use 
of the item leads the victim to reasonably believe that the 
item is likely to cause death or serious bodily injury; or 
"(b), the actor represents to the victim 
PAULG.MCMULLIN 
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1 verbally or in any other manner that he is in control of 
2 such an item." 
3 I'm just reading from that statute. 
4 And then "'Serious bodily injury' means bodily 
5 injury that creates or causes serious permanent 
6 disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of the 
7 function of any bodily member or organ or creates a 
8 substantial risk of death." 
9 Also defined there is "bodily injury," "possess" 
10 and other — 
11 MR. BURNS: Thank you. 
12 THE COURT: — words. 
13 Go ahead. 
14 MR. BURNS: That would be the code section 1 
15 would have in mind of defining the word "dangerous weapon" 
16 as used in the criminal code in the State of Utah. 
17 THE COURT: Go ahead with your response. 
18 MR. HOLM: My response, Your Honor, is I guess 
19 we haven't really heard any evidence from anyone to that 
20 effect, that they believed this to be a - a dangerous 
21 weapon as it's defined under that provision of the code. 
22 And secondly, I guess I've got some problem 
23 or — now with overbreadth, and that is that just about 
24 anything — a pen or a pencil — could even be considered a 
25 dangerous weapon under the appropriate circumstances, and 
PAULG.McMULLIN 
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21 
22 
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I'm not sure that that 6hould be and was intended to be 
included. 
THE COURT: I'm going to deny the notion. We'll 
use the definitions out of the code for the reason that 
they — the words for referencing are defined in 76-1-601, 
and I believe it's a jury call as to whether or not this 
item which has been referred to as a shank meets the 
definition or not. 
There could be any variety of weapons or -items 
that could be debated one way or the other. This — this 
is one of them. And it appears to me to be a jury 
question, so I'm going to deny the motion. 
MR. BURNS: Thank you, Your Honor. 
MR. HOLM: Your Honor, the only witness that we 
would intend to call is Mr. Edge. I note that we're close 
to the noon hour, and perhaps we ought to just have him — 
THE COURT: Start out — you have your opening 
statement, too, that you've reserved. 
MR. HOLM: That's — but I may not give one at 
all, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. HOLM: In fact, it's looking like I probably 
won't. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. BURNS: And I need — I haven't been told of 
PAUL G. MCMULLIN 
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